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  A	  Puzzle	  for	  Epistemic	  WAMs	  	  Mona	  Simion	  	  	  Abstract	  	  In	   recent	   literature,	   a	   very	   popular	   position	   about	   the	   normativity	   of	  assertion	   claims	   that	   standards	   for	   epistemically	   proper	   assertion	   vary	  with	  practical	   context,	  while	   standards	   for	  knowledge	  do	  not.	  This	  paper	  shows	  this	  claim	  is	  strongly	  incompatible	  with	  the	  received	  value-­‐theoretic	  view	   regarding	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   axiological	   and	   the	   deontic:	  one	  of	  the	  two	  has	  to	  go.	  	  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  	  Here	   is	   a	   thesis	   that	   has	   made	   a	   nice	   career	   for	   itself	   in	   recent	  epistemological	  literature:	  	  	  
Assertion	   Sensitivism	   (SA):	   The	   degree	   of	   warrant	   necessary	   for	  epistemically1	  proper	   assertion	   varies	  with	   contextual	   features,	  while	   the	  degree	  of	  warrant	  necessary	  for	  knowledge	  stays	  fixed.	  	  
                                                1	  Crucially,	  the	  results	  of	  this	  paper	  only	  concern	  SA	  in	  its	  epistemic	  incarnation.	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And	  here	   is	   a	   fairly	   uncontroversial	   value-­‐theoretic	   claim	   concerning	   the	  relation	  between	  the	  axiological	  and	  the	  deontic:	  	  
The	  Norms/Goods	  Type	  Association	  Claim	   (the	  Associaton	  Claim,	   or	  AC	  for	  short):	  Norms	  of	  type	  X	  are	  associated	  with	  goods	  of	  type	  X.	  	  	   This	   paper	   argues	   that,	   surprisingly	   enough,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   wide	  spread	  support	   they	  enjoy,	   the	   two	  claims	  above	  are	   incompatible.	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  first	  look	  at	  the	  data	  that	  are	  taken	  to	  motivate	  SA	  (#2).	  Further	  on,	  I	  spell	  out	  what	  the	  SA	  claim	  amounts	  to	  when	  taken	  in	  conjunction	  with	  AC.	  As	   it	   turns	   out,	   if	   AC	   holds,	   SA	   is	   untenable	   (#3).	   Given	   the	  wide	   spread	  support	  for	  AC,	  I	  consider	  several	  ways	  out	  the	  SA	  supporter	  might	  take.	  I	  argue	  they	  all	  fail	  (#4).	  In	  Section	  #5	  I	  conclude.	  	  	  
2.	  Assertion	  Sensitivism	  	  Standards	   for	   proper	   assertablility	   definitely	   seem	   to	   vary	  with	   practical	  context.	  Consider,	  for	  illustration,	  the	  following	  pair	  of	  cases:	  	  	  ASPIRIN-­‐1.	   You	   remember	   having	   bought	   aspirin	   last	   month.	   As	   such,	  when	   you	   head	   together	  with	   your	   sister	   towards	   your	   place	   for	   dinner,	  and	  she	  lets	  you	  know	  she	  has	  a	  minor	  headache,	  you	  flat	  out	  assert:	  ‘Don’t	  
worry,	  I	  have	  aspirin	  at	  home’.	  	  	  ASPIRIN-­‐2.	  You	  remember	  having	  bought	  aspirin	  last	  month.	  Your	  sister’s	  two	   years	   old	   baby	   is	   having	   a	   fever,	   and	   needs	   an	   aspirin	   as	   soon	   as	  possible.	   Plausibly,	   were	   your	   sister	   to	   ask	   you:	   ‘Do	   you	   have	   aspirin	   at	  home,	  or	  should	  we	  go	  to	  the	  pharmacy?’	  you	  would	  be	  less	  inclined	  to	  flat	  out	  assert	  that	  you	  have	  aspirin	  at	  home.	  You	  would	  rather	  say	  something	  along	  the	  lines	  of:	  ‘Well,	  let’s	  drop	  by	  the	  pharmacy,	  just	  in	  case’.	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   It	   looks	   as	   though,	   in	   high	   stakes	   practical	   contexts,	   assertability	  does	   not	   come	   cheap:	   intuitively,	  more	  warrant	   is	   required	   in	  ASPIRIN2,	  but	   not	   in	   ASPIRIN1,	   for	   being	   in	   a	   position	   to	   properly	   assert	   that	   you	  have	  aspirin	  at	  home.	  Let	  us	  dub	  this	  the	  Shiftiness	  Intuition.2	  	  	   Now,	   this	   phenomenon	   is	   hardly	   a	   newly	   arrived	   guest	   at	   the	  epistemology	   table;	   however,	   popularity	   wise,	   the	   golden	   age	   of	   the	  Shiftiness	   Intuition	   began	   once	   being	   employed	   to	   defend	   contextualism	  about	  knowledge	  attributions	  (e.g.	  DeRose	  2002)	  or	  one	  variety	  or	  another	  of	   pragmatic	   encroachment	   for	   knowledge	   (e.g.	   Hawthorne	   2004);	   let	   us	  dub	  both	   these	  views	  knowledge	   sensitivism	   (SK	   for	   short).	  Roughly,	   the	  thought	   goes	   as	   follows:	   very	   plausibly,	   knowledge	   is	   the	   norm	   of	  epistemically	  proper	  assertion;	  that	  is,	  one	  is	  in	  a	  good	  enough	  position	  to	  make	  an	  epistemically	  proper	  assertion	  that	  p	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  p	   (KNA).3	  If	   that	   is	   the	   case,	   however,	   it	   follows	   that	   the	   standards	   for	  knowledge	   go	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   the	   standards	   for	   proper	   assertability.	  Given	  that	  the	  latter	  seem	  to	  vary	  with	  context,	  so	  will	  the	  former.	  	  	   For	   people	   who	   like	   classical	   invariantism	   (CI)	   about	   knowledge	  attribution,	  however,	   the	   jump	   from	  variation	   in	  assertability	  with	  stakes	  to	   contextualism	   or	   pragmatic	   encroachment	   seemed	   rushed.	   As	   such,	  these	   authors	   venture	   to	   account	   for	   the	   Shiftiness	   Intuition	   under	   a	  classical	   invariantist	  umbrella	  by	  arguing	  for	  context-­‐sensitivity	  of	  proper	  assertability.	  	   The	   thought	   behind	   the	   view	   is,	   roughly,	   to	   explain	   the	   intuitive	  variability	  in	  propriety	  from	  one	  ASPIRIN	  case	  to	  the	  other	  by	  keeping	  the	  standards	  for	  knowledge	  fixed,	  and	  allowing	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  warrant	  for	  epistemically	  proper	  assertion	  varies	  with	  context.	   In	   some	  contexts,	   less	  than	  knowledge	  is	  required	  for	  epistemically	  proper	  assertion,	  while	  more	  
                                                2	  The	  term	  was	  coined	  by	  Fantl	  and	  McGrath	  (2012).	  3	  The	  locus	  classicus	  for	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  necessity	  claim	  involved	  in	  KNA	  is	  Williamson	  (2000).	  For	  support	  for	  the	  sufficiency	  claim,	  see	  Simion	  (2016b).	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warrant	   may	   be	   needed	   in	   others.4	  This	   view	   has	   become	   known	   in	   the	  literature	   as	   a	   Warranted	   Assertability	   Maneuver	   (WAM) 5 	  against	  knowledge	  sensitivism.	  	  	   In	   this	   respect,	   thus,	   according	   to	   SA,	   although	   the	   speaker’s	  epistemic	   status	   remains	   unchanged	   in	   the	   two	   ASPIRIN	   cases,	   the	  assertion	   ‘I	   have	   aspirin	   at	   home’	   would	   not	   be	   epistemically	   proper	   in	  ASPIRIN	  2	  due	   to	   change	   in	   the	   relevant	   contextual	   features,6	  most	   likely	  related	  to	  the	  relevant	  stakes.	  That	  is,	  while	  the	  speaker	  does	  know	  that	  he	  has	  aspirin	  at	  home	   in	  both	  ASPIRIN	  1	  and	  ASPIRIN	  2,	  due	   to	  changes	   in	  context,	   it	   is	   only	   in	   the	   former	   but	   not	   in	   the	   latter	   that	   his	   relevant	  assertion	  would	  be	  epistemically	  proper.	  	  	  
2.	  Type	  Association	  	  Here	  is	  one	  plausible	  thought:	  if	  there’s	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  an	  epistemic	  norm	  for	  assertion	  out	  there	  in	  the	  first	  place,	   it	   is	   likely	  there	  to	  make	  it	   likely	  that	  assertion	  delivers	  the	  epistemic	  goods	  we	  are	  using	  it	  for.	  And	  here	  is	  a	   fairly	   innocent	  value-­‐theoretic	  claim	  to	  capture	   this	   thought:	   it	   looks	  as	  
                                                4	  SA	  also	  comes	  in	  more	  than	  one	  variety;	  first	  there	  are	  people	  thinking	  that	  assertion	  is	  governed	   by	   one	   norm	   which	   stipulates	   that	   the	   appropriate	   amount	   of	   warrant	   for	  proper	   assertion	   varies	   with	   contextual	   features	   (e.g.	   Brown	   (2010),	   Gerken	   (2012),	  Goldberg	   (2015)	   MCKinnon	   (2013),	   Rescorla	   (2009)).	   Another	   way	   to	   be	   a	   sensitivist	  about	   assertion	   is	   to	   stipulate	   several	   norms	   governing	   assertion,	   depending	   on	   the	  context	   (e.g.	   Greenough	   (2011),	   Levin	   (2008),	   Stone	   (2007)).	   The	   subtle	   differences	  between	  the	  above	  views	  are,	  however,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	   irrelevant	  for	  now	  (but	  see	  the	  next	   section	   for	   refinements).	   That	   is	   because	   this	   paper	   dwells	   at	   a	   higher	   level	   of	  generality:	  what	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  is	  the	  claim	  that	  epistemically	  proper	  assertability	  varies	  with	  practical	  stakes,	  no	  matter	  what	  triggers	  the	  variation	  in	  propriety	  in	  question.	  Insofar	  as	  these	  authors	  stand	  by	  this	  claim,	  they	  are	  the	  proper	  target	  of	  this	  paper.	  5	  Strictly	  speaking,	   there	  are	   two	  ways	  one	  can	  pull	  a	  WAM:	  one	  can	  place	   the	  source	  of	  context	  sensitivity	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  itself	  (SA),	  or,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  defend	  a	   fixed	   norm	   and	   argue	   that	   pragmatic,	   Gricean	   considerations	   influence	   propriety	   in	  context	   (e.g.	   Rysview	   2001).	   This	   paper	   is	   only	   concerned	   with	   the	   first	   incarnation	  thereof.	  	  6	  It	   is	   fair	   to	   say	   that	   defenders	   of	   SA	   go	   on	   separate	  ways	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   listing	   the	  relevant	  contextual	  determiners;	  that	  is,	  for	  some	  of	  them,	  practical	  concerns	  figure	  higher	  on	   the	   list	   (e.g.	   Gerken	   2012),6	  while	   others	   (e.g.	   Goldberg	   2015)	   focus	   more	   on	   non-­‐practical	  context	  sensitivity.	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though	  a	  norm’s	  pertaining	  to	  one	  type	  or	  another	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  type	  of	   goods	   it	   is	   associated	  with.	   Thus,	   prudential	   norms	  will	   be	   associated	  with	  prudential	  goods,	  moral	  norms	  will	  be	  associated	  with	  moral	  goods,	  etc.	  Epistemic	  norms	  will	   thus	  come	  together	  with	  epistemic	  goods.	  Peter	  Graham	   puts	   the	   point	   succinctly:	   “Epistemic	  norms	   in	   this	   sense	   govern	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  say,	  do	  or	  think	  from	  an	  epistemic	  point	  of	  view,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  promoting	  true	  belief	  and	  avoiding	  error”	  (Graham	  2012).	  What	   we	   get,	   then,	   is	   the	   following	   easy	   way	   to	   individuate	   normative	  constraints:	  	  
The	  Norms/Goods	  Type	  Association	  Claim	   (the	  Associaton	  Claim,	   or	  AC	  for	  short):	  Norms	  of	  type	  X	  are	  associated	  with	  goods	  of	  type	  X.	  	  Again,	  notice	  that	  AC	  is	  pretty	  innocent	  from	  a	  value-­‐theoretic	  perspective.	  That	  is	  because	  the	  mere	  association	  claim	  between	  norms	  and	  goods	  of	  the	  same	   type	  does	  not	   imply	  any	  substantial	  value-­‐theoretic	  commitment;	   it	  holds	   on	   both	   the	   most	   notable	   views	   regarding	   the	   relationship	   of	   the	  good	   to	   the	   deontic.7	  The	   teleologist	   explains	   the	   ‘ought’	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  ‘good’;	  according	  to	  this	  philosopher,	  the	  following	  is	  true:	  	  
AC-­‐Teleology:	  Norm	  of	   type	  X	  are	   there	   to	  guide	  us	   in	   reaching	  goods	  of	  type	  X.	  	  	  	   The	   deontologist	   reverses	   the	   order	   of	   explanation:	   according	   to	  ‘Fitting	  Attitude’	  accounts	  of	  value,	  	  	  
                                                7	  For	  support	  of	  AC:	  for	  a	  good	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  relevant	  literature	  in	  value	  theory,	  see,	   for	   instance,	   Schroeder	   (2012);	   for	   champions	   of	   the	   teleological	   direction	   of	  explanation,	   see	   e.g.	  Moore	   (1903),	   Portmore	   (2005).	   Sidwick	   (1907)	   and	   Slote	   (1989).	  For	   the	   deontological	   direction,	   see	   e.g.	   Scanlon	   (1998)	   Ewing	   (1947),	   Rabinowicz	   and	  Rönnow-­‐Rasmussen	  (2004)).	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AC-­‐Deontology:	  Goods	  of	  type	  X	  are	  only	  valuable	  because	  norms	  of	  type	  X	  give	  us	  reasons	  to	  favour	  them.	  	  	  	   Anyhow,	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  the	  mere	  association	  claim	  holds.	  Let	  us	  now	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  SA	  proposal	  concerning	  the	  normativity	  of	  assertion	   and	   at	   how	   it	   fares	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   Association	   Claim.	  First,	   what	   we	   are	   talking	   about	   is	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   of	   assertion.	   The	  question,	   then,	   becomes:	   what	   is	   the	   relevant	   epistemic	   good?	   Many	  authors	   (e.g.	   David	   (2005))	   regard	   truth	   as	   the	   fundamental	   epistemic	  good.	  The	  most	  prominent	  counter	  candidate	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  knowledge	  (Williamson	   (2000)).	   For	  our	  purposes	  here,	   in	   order	   to	   stay	  on	   the	   safe	  side,	  we	  will	   test	   the	  plausibility	  SA	  for	  both	  candidate	  goods.8	  Note,	  also,	  that	  the	  epistemic	  interest	  at	  stake	  can	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  both	  at	  the	  speaker	  and	  at	  the	  hearer’s	  end.	  As	  such,	  we	  will	  have	  to	  look	  on	  both	  sides.	  	  	   Let	  us	   start	  with	   teleological	  order	  of	  explanation.	  By	  AC,	   then,	  SA	  proponents	  will	  also	  be	  committed	  to:	  	  	  
SA-­‐Teleology:	   The	   SA	   norm	   is	   there	   to	   guide	   one	   in	   reaching	   epistemic	  goods.	  	  	  	  	   Spelling	  out	  the	  norm,	  and	  on	  a	  truth	  goal	  assumption,	  then,	  we	  get:	  	  
SA-­‐Teleologytruth	  One	  should	  proportion	  the	  degree	  of	  warrant	  supporting	  one’s	   assertion	   to	   contextual	   features	   to	   the	   aim	   of	   making	   a	   true	  assertion/	  generating	  true	  belief	  in	  one’s	  hearer.	  	  
                                                8	  Note,	  also,	  that	  the	  argument	  can	  be	  run	  in	  a	  parallel	  fashion	  for	  a	  justification	  goal	  (and	  the	  results	  are	  likely	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  results	  for	  the	  knowledge	  goal,	  insofar	  as	  what	  is	  meant	  is	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification).	  Also,	  see	  below	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  what	  is	  the	  case	  on	   the	   assumption	   of	   an	   epistemic	   goal	   that	   itself	   varies	   with	   practical	   stakes,	   such	   as	  ‘providing	  actionable	  information’.	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   But	   surely	   SA	   proponents	   would	   not	   want	   to	   stand	   behind	   this	  formulation,	   since	   it	   is	   blatantly	   false:	   pragmatic	   factors	  do	  not	   influence	  truth-­‐conduciveness.	  Furthermore,	   I	  doubt	   that	   (many	  of)	   the	   supporters	  of	   SA	   themselves,	   given	   the	   classical	   invariantist	  motivations	   behind	   the	  view,	  would	  want	   to	   stand	   behind	   such	   formulation.	   Here	   is	   Gerken,	   for	  one:	   “…epistemic	   warrant	   is	   determined	   by	   traditional	   truth-­‐related	  factors	  and	  not	  by	  pragmatic	  factors	  (Gerken	  2012,	  377).	  	   In	   the	   light	   of	   all	   this,	  maybe	  we	   should	   just	  move	   on;	  maybe	   the	  real	   problem	   is	   the	   truth	   goal.	   Let	   us	   turn	   to	   knowledge9	  as	   the	   main	  epistemic	   good,	   then,	   plug	   it	   into	   the	   SA-­‐Consequentialism	   and	   see	  what	  happens	  to	  the	  framework:	  	  
SA-­‐Teleologyknowledge	   One	   should	   proportion	   the	   degree	   of	   warrant	  supporting	   one’s	   assertion	   to	   contextual	   features	   to	   the	   aim	   of	  making	   a	  knowledgeable	  assertion/	  generating	  knowledge	  in	  one’s	  hearer.	  	  	   Unfortunately	   for	  the	  SA	  proponent,	   this	   formulation,	  although	  not	  strikingly	  false,	  amounts	  to	  what	  she	  was	  trying	  to	  avoid	  in	  the	  first	  place;	  that	  is,	  context	  sensitivity	  of	  knowledge.	  Here	  is	  how:	  in	  the	  speaker’s	  case,	  the	  route	  to	  SK	  is	  pretty	  straightforward:	  if,	  in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  know,	  the	  speaker	  is	  in	  need	  of	  more	  epistemic	  support	  in	  high-­‐stakes	  contexts	  than	  in	  low-­‐stakes	  ones,	  we	  are	  back	  in	  the	  SK	  yard.	  	  	   While	   on	   the	   hearer’s	   side	   a	   similar	   result	  might	   be	   less	   obvious,	  notice	   that	  what	   the	  claim	  amounts	   to,	   as	  a	   fact	  of	   the	  matter,	   is	   that	   the	  hearer	  needs	  an	  epistemically	  better	  source	   in	  high-­‐stakes	  scenarios	  than	  in	   low	   stakes	   ones	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   knowledge.	   Surely,	   given	   the	   strict	  invariantist	  motivations	  behind	  SA,	   this	   is	  an	  unacceptable	  result,	   since	   it	  dissolves	  the	  view,	  in	  its	  original	  formulation,	  by	  collapsing	  it	  into	  SK;	  what	  the	   SA	   claim	  would	   amount	   to,	   under	   this	   formulation,	  would	   be	   a	   view	  
                                                9	  Note	  that	  prominent	  defenders	  of	  CA	  (e.g.	  Goldberg	  2015)	  explicitly	  support	  generating	  testimonial	  knowledge	  as	  the	  main	  epistemic	  role	  of	  assertion.	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according	  to	  which	  one	  needs	  a	  degree	  of	  warrant	  that	  is	  suitable	  to	  one’s	  practical	  context	  in	  order	  to	  be	  knowledgeable.	  	   If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  SA	  seems	  to	  not	  be	  very	  nicely	  compatible	  with	  a	  teleological	   value-­‐theoretic	   framework.	   On	   one	   hand,	   this	   is	   rather	  unfortunate;	  after	  all,	  ideally,	  one	  does	  not	  want	  one’s	  preferred	  account	  of	  the	   normativity	   of	   assertion	   to	   commit	   one	   to	   very	   substantive	   value-­‐theoretic	   claims.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   given	   the	   dubious	   name	  consequentialism	  has	  made	  for	  itself	  on	  independent	  grounds,	  maybe	  this	  should	  not	  worry	  the	  SA	  champion	  too	  much,	  however.	  Let	  us	  change	  the	  framework,	   then,	   and	   go	   for	   the	   deontological	   incarnation	   of	   the	  Association	  Claim.	  Consider,	  first:	  	  
SA-­‐Deontologytruth:	  Truth	  is	  an	  epistemic	  good	  because	  the	  SA	  norm	  gives	  us	  reason	  to	  favour	  it.	  	  It	   is	   a	  bit	  mysterious,	   however,	   in	   virtue	  of	  what	   exactly	  does	   SA	  give	  us	  reason	   to	   favour	   truth	   rather	   than,	   say,	   falsehood.	   After	   all,	   it	   looks	   as	  though,	  independently	  of	  whether	  I	  am	  right	  or	  wrong	  about	  whether	  p	  is	  the	  case,	  according	  to	  SA,	  the	  important	  thing	  is	  that	  I	  don’t	  assert	  it	  unless	  I	  have	  a	  contextually	  appropriate	  amount	  of	  warrant.	  As	  such,	  SA	  seems	  to	  be	  completely	  indifferent	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  whether	  I	  am	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  truth	  or	  not,	  and	  therefore	  fail	  to	  favour	  it	  in	  any	  way.	  	  	  
SA-­‐Deontologyknowledge:	   Knowledge	   is	   an	   epistemic	   good	   because	   the	   SA	  norm	  gives	  us	  reason	  to	  favour	  it.	  	  	  Again,	  this	  formulation	  is	  either	  false,	  or	  it	  collapses	  SA	  into	  SK.	  Recall	  that	  SA	  asks	  for	  less	  warrant	  in	  low	  stakes	  scenarios	  and	  more	  warrant	  in	  high	  stakes;	   as	   such,	   it	   gives	   us	   no	   particular	   reason	   to	   favour	   classical	  invariantist	   knowledge	   over	   other	   epistemic	   standings	   characterized	   by	  less,	   respectively	  more	  warrant.	   If,	   however,	  knowledge	   itself	   is	   sensitive	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to	  practical	  context,	  as	  SK	  would	  have	  it,	  the	  SA	  norm	  is	  able	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  reason	  to	  favour	  it.	  	   To	   sum	   up,	   then:	   if	   the	   (value-­‐theoretically	   innocent)	   Association	  Claim	  between	  norms	  and	  goods	  of	  a	  particular	  type	  holds,	  SA	  comes	  out	  untenable	   for	   the	  main	   candidates	   for	   the	   central	   epistemic	   good	   in	   the	  literature.	   On	   both	   available	  AC	   directions	   of	   explanation,	   in	   a	   truth-­‐goal	  framework,	   its	   claims	   turn	   out	   false,	   or,	   at	   least,	   highly	   implausible.	   In	   a	  knowledge-­‐goal	   framework,	   the	  position	  collapses	   into	  context	  sensitivity	  of	  knowledge,	  which	  was	  what	  its	  proponents	  were	  reacting	  against	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	   What	   SA	   seems	   to	   need	   is	   a	   complementary	   pluralistic	   account	  regarding	   the	   epistemic	   goal,	   tightly	   connected	   to	   contextual	   practical	  determiners.	   That	   is,	   roughly,	   a	   view	   on	  which	   the	   epistemic	   goal	   varies	  with	  practical	  stakes,	  such	  as:	  the	  goal	  of	  assertion	  is	  providing	  actionable	  information.10	  On	   such	   a	   view,	   variation	   in	   warrant	   for	   proper	   assertion	  would	  just	  track	  the	  variation	  in	  epistemic	  goal,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  would	  track	  the	  variation	  in	  epistemic	  needs	  given	  the	  practical	  context.	  	  	   Now,	   to	  my	   knowledge,	   this	   view	   is	   still	   in	   need	   of	   defence	   in	   its	  own	  right;	  thus,	  as	  things	  stand,	  it	  can	  hardly	  be	  employed	  to	  the	  support	  of	   SA,	   given	   that	   its	   theoretical	   up-­‐	   and	   downsides	   are	   completely	  underexplored.	  	  	   I	  will	  bracket	  this	  however,	  and,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  maximal	  charity,	  try	  to	  have	  a	  look	  at	  how	  such	  a	  picture	  would	  work.	  	  	   A	  few	  serious	  worries	  arise	  even	  from	  just	  this	  rough	  sketch	  for	  the	  view.	  First,	  note	  that	  holding	  this	  practical-­‐context	  variant	  view	  about	  the	  epistemic	  goal	   in	  general	  might	  get	  SA	   into	   trouble	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   the	  normativity	   of	   belief;	   that	   is,	   if	   some	   variety	   of	   (the	   very	   popular)	   norm	  commonality	   assumption	   is	   true	   about	   assertion	   and	  belief,	   SA	  will	   be	   in	  danger	  of	  collapsing	  into	  SK,	  if	  they	  will	  also	  hold	  that	  the	  epistemic	  goal	  –	  
                                                10	  Jessica	  Brown	  and	  Sandy	  Goldberg	  (in	  personal	  communication)	  suggested	  the	  WAM-­‐er	  might	  want	  to	  take	  this	  route.	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and	   therefore	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   -­‐	   of	   belief	   also	   varies	   with	   practical	  factors.	  To	  see	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  note	  that	  many	  (if	  not	  most)	  people11	  in	  the	   debate	   stand	   behind	   something	   like	   the	   following	   deontic	   thesis	   for	  belief	  (DTB):	  	  DTB:	  A	  belief	  is	  epistemically	  permissible	  iff	  epistemically	  justified,	  	  where	  the	  justification	  at	  stake	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  knowledge	  level	  justification.	  If	  epistemically	  permissible	  belief	  varies	  with	  stakes,	  however,	  on	  DTB,	  so	  does	  knowledge-­‐level	  justification,	  and	  therefore	  knowledge	  itself.	  We	  are	  back	  to	  SK.	  	   As	  far	  as	  I	  can	  see,	  there	  are	  three	  ways	  to	  go	  at	  this	  point	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  this	  result:	  12	  either	  (1)	  restrict	  the	  view	  to	  assertion	  and	  deny	  the	  commonality	   assumption	   (and	   therefore	   either	   the	   normative	   import	   of	  the	   extremely	   widely	   endorsed	   belief/assertion	   parallel,	   or	   the	   parallel	  itself)	   (which,	   I	   take	   it,	   is	   a	   fairly	   serious	   theoretical	   cost,	   or	   in	   need	   of	  independent	   support).	   (2)	   Hold	   that	   epistemically	   permissible	   assertion	  goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   practically	   permissible	   belief,	   not	   with	  epistemically	  permissible	  belief;	  The	  problem	  with	  both	  (1)	  and	  (2)	  is	  that	  they	   will	   allow	   for	   intuitively	   strange	   situations	   whereby	   a	   speaker’s	  assertion	   that	   p	   will	   count	   as	   epistemically	   permissible	   (in	   virtue	   of	   its	  degree	  of	  warrant	  being	  good	  enough	   for	  hearer’s	  practically	  permissible	  belief),	   although	   they	   do	   not	   believe	   that	   p	   themselves,	   in	   virtue	   of	   not	  having	  enough	  warrant	  to	  epistemically	  permissibly	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  	   (3)	   Deny	   that	   the	   status	   at	   stake	   in	   DTB	   is	   knowledge-­‐level	  justification,	   rather	   than	   some	   practically	   sensitive	   variety	   of	   epistemic	  justification	  for	  belief.	  This	  is	  an	  epistemically	  normative	  pluralistic	  picture	  for	   belief:	   a	   belief	   might	   be	   epistemically	   justified	   even	   if	   it	   is	   not	   a	  justification	   that	   is	   strong	   enough	   as	   the	   one	   that	   is	   required	   for	  
                                                11	  See,	  e.g.	  (Williamson	  2000),	  (Simion,	  Kelp	  &Ghijsen	  2016a).	  	  12	  Manny	  thanks	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  pressing	  me	  on	  this	  point.	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knowledge.	   The	   standards	   of	   epistemic	   justification/permissibility	   for	  belief	  might	  therefore	  be	  context-­‐sensitive,	  even	  though	  the	  standards	  for	  
knowledge	   level	   justification/permissibility	   are	   not	   context-­‐sensitive.	   The	  former	  track	  actionability,	  the	  latter	  do	  not.	  A	  few	  things	  about	  this.	  First,	  while	   I	   grant	   that	   this	   picture	   occupies	   a	   position	   in	   the	   logical	   space,	   I	  want	   to	   strongly	   emphasize	   that	   it	   is	   not	   defended	   anywhere	   in	   the	  literature,	   and	   hardly	   a	   straightforward,	   theoretically	   neutral	   way	   to	   go.	  Therefore,	   I	   take	   it,	   it	   requires	   very	   serious	  defence	   in	  order	   to	  be	   taken	  seriously.	  Here	  are	  a	   few	  reasons	   for	   this:	  First,	  because	   it	  needs	   to	  deny	  the	  widely	  accepted	  DTB.	  Second,	  because	  it	  needs	  to	  stipulate	  normative	  pluralism	  where	   all	   the	   competing	   views	   do	   not	   –	   so	   it	   scores	  worse	   on	  simplicity	   grounds.	   Third,	   because	   on	   this	   view,	   one	   can	   have	   a	  knowledgeable	   belief	   that	   one	   should,	   epistemically,	   not	   hold	   which	   is	  rather	  counter-­‐intuitive.	   Fourth,	  most	  crucially,	  the	  defender	  of	  such	  an	  account	  will	  want	   to	   avoid	   the	   following	   results:	   on	   her	   view,	   given	   that	  epistemic	   permissibility	   of	   belief	   varies	  with	   practical	   stakes,	   believing	   a	  falsehood,	   or	   something	   one	   has	   no	   justification	   whatsoever	   for,	   when	  nothing	   hinges	   on	   it,	   or	   in	   return	   for	   one	   million	   dollars	   would	   be	  
epistemically	   perfectly	   fine.	   That	   seems	   like	   quite	   a	   theoretical	   cost.	   In	   a	  similar	  vein,	  when	  nothing	  of	   importance	   is	  at	  stake	   for	   the	  hearer	  –	  say,	  for	  instance,	  we	  are	  just	  making	  conversation	  about	  the	  weather	  –	  it	  should	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  epistemically	  fine	  to	  assert	  with	  no	  warrant	  whatsoever.	  All	  this,	  of	  course,	  does	  not	  seem	  right.	  	  	   One	   can	  maybe	   try	   to	   address	   this	   problem	   by	   setting	   a	   minimal	  threshold	  for	  (epistemically)	  permissible	  assertion/belief.13	  One	  way	  to	  do	  this	   in	   a	   non-­‐ad-­‐hoc	   manner	   would	   be	   by	   arguing	   for	   some	   pragmatic	  considerations	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  relevant	  threshold.	  For	  instance,	  one	  could	  think	   that	   something	   like	   the	   maxim	   of	   Relevance	   would	   recommend	  against	   making	   assertions	   devoid	   of	   any	   practical	   importance	   to	   begin	  
                                                13	  On	  Greenough’s	  (2010)	  view,	  for	  instance,	  knowledge	  is	  the	  minimal	  threshold	  for	  permissible	  assertion.	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with.14	  Or,	   alternatively,	   one	   could	   think	   that,	   in	   virtue	   of	   the	   maxim	   of	  Quality,	  asserting	  that	  p	  carries	  the	   implicature	  that	  there	   is	  some	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  As	  such,	  on	  this	  view,	  in	  no-­‐stakes	  cases,	  while	  asserting	  in	   the	  absence	  of	  any	  warrant	   is	  strictly	  speaking	  epistemically	  proper	   in	  virtue	   of	   it	   being	   practically	   proper,	   it	   comes	   across	   as	   intuitively	  inappropriate	   due	   to	   considerations	   pertaining	   to	   the	   pragmatics	   of	  language.	  	   Alas,	  though,	  this	  move	  will	  not	  get	  the	  champion	  of	  the	  variant	  goal	  view	   too	   far	   either.	   After	   all,	   one	   can	   easily	   imagine	   cases	   where	   the	  amount	  of	  warrant	  is	  problematically	  raised	  rather	  than	  lowered.	  Take,	  for	  instance,	  a	  case	  where	   I	  am	  offered	  one	  million	  dollars	   to	  withhold	  belief	  unless	   I	   am	   certain	   (as	   in	   Cartesian	   certainty)	   that	   p.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  defender	  of	  the	  variant	  goal	  view	  will	  have	  to	  say	  that,	  if	  I	  see	  that	  there	  is	  a	  table	  in	  front	  of	  me,	  and	  therefore	  I	  believe	  that	  there’s	  a	  table	  in	  front	  of	  me,	   my	   belief	   is	   epistemically	   impermissible.	   Again,	   this	   does	   not	   sound	  right.	  	  	   What	   the	   defender	   of	   this	   account	   seems	   to	   be	   in	   need	   of,	   then,	  would	  be	  a	  principled	  way	  to	  separate	  the	  ‘good’	  prudential	  considerations	  from	   the	   ‘bad’	   ones;	   I	   submit	   that	   there	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   there	   is	   no	  easy,	  non	  question	  begging	  answer	  for	  this	  problem	  in	  sight.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  
4.	  Objections	  and	  Replies	  	  	  One	  reply	   that	  might	  come	   from	  the	  SA	  camp,	   though,	  could	  go	  along	   the	  following	  lines:	  the	  SA	  champion	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  variability	  in	  warrant	  is	   required	   for	   belief	   generation.	   In	   high	   stakes	   scenarios,	   the	   thought	  would	  go,	   the	  hearer	  might	  be	  extremely	  cautious	  and	  ask	  the	  speaker	  to	  
                                                14	  Mikkel	  Gerken	  (p.c.)	  suggested	  this	  might	  be	  the	  way	  he	  might	  want	  to	  go	  about	  this	  issue.	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back	   her	   assertion.	   In	   this	   case,	   being	   in	   possession	   of	   an	   amount	   of	  warrant	  appropriate	  to	  the	  situation	  would	  put	  the	  speaker	  in	  a	  position	  to	  be	  able	   to	  meet	   this	  demand,	  and	   thus	   successfully	  generate	   the	   relevant	  belief	  in	  her	  hearer.	  	  	   The	   problem	   with	   this	   move,	   however,	   is	   that,	   on	   the	   present	  formulation	  of	  SA,	  it	  will	  not	  do.	  That	  is,	  as	  it	  stands,	  SA	  only	  ask	  speakers	  to	  be	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  the	  relevant	  degree	  of	  warrant,	  not	  to	  also	  have	  access	  to	  it	  so	  as	  to	  be	  able	  to	  back	  their	  assertion	  if	  needed.	  	  	   Notice,	   also,	   that	   adding	   the	   necessary	   access	   requirement	   would	  render	   the	   view	   fairly	   implausible;	   after	   all,	   surely	   small	   children	   can	  produce	  epistemically	  proper	  assertions,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  don’t	  have	   very	  well	   developed	   reflective	   capacities.	   Furthermore,	  most	   of	   our	  knowledge	   is	   stocked	   in	   memory	   and,	   for	   most	   of	   it,	   we	   do	   not	   really	  remember	  how	  we	  came	  to	  acquire	  it	  to	  begin	  with.	  I,	   for	  instance,	  surely	  do	  not	  remember	  how	  I	  got	  to	  know	  that	  Berlin	  is	  the	  capital	  of	  Germany.	  Does	   that	   mean	   I	   cannot	   make	   the	   relevant	   assertion?	   The	   answer,	  according	  to	  this	  enhanced	  version	  of	  SA	  will	  have	  to	  be	  ‘no’.	  	  	   Two	  options	  are	  still	  available	  to	  the	  SA	  defender	  at	  this	  point:	  first,	  she	   could	   make	   the	   need	   for	   discursive	   justification	   context-­‐dependent	  also,	   such	   as	   to	   only	   encounter	   the	   cognitively	   unsophisticated	   asserters	  problem	  when	  the	  stakes	  are	  high.	  This	  more	  restricted	  version	  seems	  to	  enjoy	   more	   plausibility.	   Gerken’s	   view,	   for	   instance,	   explicitly	   requests	  that,	   in	   some	   contexts,	   but	   not	   all,	   one	   should	   be	   able	   to	   back	   one’s	  assertion	  with	  appropriate	  support.	  	  	   Alternatively,	   she	   could	   argue	   that	   the	   need	   for	   more	   warrant	   in	  high	  stakes	  than	  in	  low	  stakes	  scenarios	  pertains	  to	  hearers	  not	  believing	  what	   the	   speaker	   says	   unless	   they	   not	   only	   know	   the	   content	   of	   their	  assertion,	   but	   they	   also	   know	   that	   they	   know	   –	   which,	   in	   turn,	   requires	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more	   warrant	   than	   mere	   knowledge.15	  This	   picture,	   in	   turn,	   would	   have	  nothing	   to	  do	  with	   the	   standards	   for	  knowledge;	  quite	   to	   the	   contrary,	   it	  explicitly	  allows	  that	  those	  standards	  remain	  fixed.	  	  	  	   There	  are,	  however,	  good	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  prospects	  for	  this	  sort	  of	  move	  are	  rather	  dim.	  To	  see	  this,	  let	  us	  take	  another	  look	  at	  the	  envisaged	   SA	   champion’s	   reply:	   the	   variability	   in	  warrant	   is	   required	   for	  belief	   generation,	   not	   for	   its	   truth.	   In	   high	   stakes	   scenarios,	   the	   hearer	  might	   be	   extremely	   cautious	   and	   ask	   the	   speaker	   to	   either	   back	   her	  assertion	   with	   the	   contextually	   appropriate	   discursive	   justification	   or,	  alternatively,	   to	   know	   that	   they	   know.	  Were	   the	   speaker	   not	   able	   to	   do	  so/not	  to	  have	  knowledge	  of	  knowledge,	  the	  hearer	  would	  not	  believe	  the	  content	   of	   the	   assertion,	   and,	   as	   such,	   the	   aim	   of	   generating	   of	   true	  belief/knowledge	  would	  be	  missed.	  	  	   Now,	   note	   that,	   for	   all	   is	   said	   above,	   we	   are	   dealing	   with	   a	  descriptive,	  empirical	  claim:	  the	  thought	  is	  that,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  there	  is	  a	   chance	   that	   the	   hearer	   requests	   discursive	   justification/knowledge	   of	  knowledge	  for	  believing.	  But,	  of	  course,	  this	  cannot	  be	  what	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  relevant	   to	   the	  normative	  claim	  of	  SA;	  after	  all,	  maybe	  hearers	  are	  not	   in	  their	  epistemic	  right	  to	  do	  so,	   in	  which	  case	  no	  obligation	  for	  the	  speaker	  should	  follow.	  Just	  because	  hearers	  might,	  for	  instance,	  require	  speakers	  to	  wear	   red	  hats	   if	   they	  want	   to	  be	  believed,	   it	  does	  not	   follow	   that	  we	  will	  have	   a	   red-­‐hat-­‐wearing	  norm	  of	  proper	   assertion	   thereby,	   at	   least	   surely	  not	   an	   epistemic	   such	  norm.	   Similarly,	   just	   because,	   in	  high	   stakes	   cases,	  hearers	  usually	  require	  speakers	  to	  know	  that	  they	  know	  or,	  alternatively,	  to	  offer	  contextually	  appropriate	  discursive	  justification,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  we	  will	  have	  any	  such	  requirement	  on	  the	  speaker’s	  side.	  Surely	  the	  SA	  defender	  does	  not	  want	  to	  say	  that	  any	  absurd	  claim	  hearers	  might	  have	  is	  going	   to	   affect	   the	   content	   of	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   governing	   speaker’s	  speech	  acts.	  	  
                                                15	  See	  (Williamson	  2005)	  for	  an	  account	  along	  these	  lines.	  Thanks	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  pressing	  me	  on	  this.	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   What	   seems	   to	   be	   needed	   is	   a	   normative	   claim	   alongside	   the	  empirical	  one;	  for	  any	  obligation	  to	  follow	  on	  the	  speaker’s	  side,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that,	  on	  top	  of	   them	  being	   in	  the	  habit	   to	  do	  so,	  hearers	  are	  also	  epistemically	   permitted	   to	   ask	   for	   discursive	   justification/knowledge	   of	  knowledge.	  What	  is	  needed,	  then,	  is	  a	  norm	  that	  makes	  the	  requirement	  for	  knowledge	   of	   knowledge/discursive	   justification	   permissible.	  Furthermore,	   given	   that	   we	   are	   interested	   in	   the	   epistemic	   norm	   of	  assertion,	   the	   relevant	   norm	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   hearer	   also	   needs	   to	   be	  epistemic,	  rather	  than	  prudential	  or	  moral.	  	  	   In	   a	   nutshell,	   then,	   what	   we	   need	   is	   an	   (importantly)	   epistemic	  norm	   that	   makes	   it	   permissible	   for	   hearers	   to	   only	   believe	   what	   the	  speaker	   says	   if	   the	   latter	   has	   knowledge	   of	   knowledge/	   contextually	  appropriate	  discursive	   justification.	  This,	   however,	  will	   easily	   threaten	   to	  drive	  the	  SA	  defender	  back	  in	  the	  trouble	  he	  was	  trying	  to	  avoid	  to	  begin	  with.	  Here	  is	  how:	  again,	  it	  is	  widely	  accepted	  that	  a	  belief	  is	  epistemically	  justified	   (where	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   is	   the	   justification	   required	   for	  knowledge)	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  is	  epistemically	  permissible	  (DTB).16	  Therefore,	  a	   stakes-­‐variant	   epistemic	   norm	   of	   belief	   will	   readily	   result	   in	   stakes	  variation	   for	   knowledge.	   Of	   course,	   one	   can	   have	   a	   stakes-­‐variant	  prudential	   norm	   of	   belief,	   for	   instance.	   However,	   again,	   this	   prudential	  norm	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  hearer	  would	  only	  be	  able	  to	  generate	  a	  prudential	  norm	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  speaker;	  what	  we	  are	  searching	  for,	  though,	  is	  the	  distinctively	   epistemic	   norm	   of	   assertion.	   The	   two	   will,	   of	   course,	   often	  come	   apart:	   it	   might	   be	   epistemically	   perfectly	   fine,	   for	   instance,	   to	   tell	  your	   boss	   that	   he’s	   bald	   if	   you	   know	   it	   to	   be	   the	   case,	   but,	   prudentially	  speaking,	  it	  is	  definitely	  better	  to keep quiet (Brown 2011). 	   One	  last	  option	  for	  the	  SA	  defender	  that	  still	  needs	  to	  be	  discussed	  is	  her	   possible	   retreat	   from	   direct	   to	   indirect	   practical	   stakes	   sensitivity.	  According	  to	  this	  account,	   the	  reason	  why	  we	  need	  more	  warrant	   in	  high	  
                                                16	  See	  e.g.	  Williamson	  (2000),	  Simion,	  Kelp	  and	  Ghijsen	  (2016a).	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stakes	   than	   in	   low	   stakes	   is	   because	   more	   error	   possibilities	   become	  salient.	  As	  such,	  proper	  assertability	  is	  only	  indirectly	  sensitive	  to	  practical	  stakes,	   through	   its	   being	   sensitive	   to	   the	   (genuinely)	   epistemic	   need	   for	  dismissing	   salient	   error	   possibilities.	   Patrick	   Greenough’s	   (2011)	   view	  affords	   this	   way	   out.	   According	   to	   Greenough,	   assertion	   is	   governed	   by	  different	   norms	   in	   high	   stakes	   and	   low	   stakes	   scenarios.	   That	   is,	   in	   high	  stakes,	  but	  not	  in	  low	  stakes,	  the	  speaker	  must	  also	  be	  able	  to	  cite	  explicit	  evidence	  against	  all	  those	  not-­‐p	  possibilities	  which	  are	  salient	  in	  the	  high-­‐standards	  in	  play.	  	  	   The	  assumption	  that	  needs	  be	  discussed	  here,	  however,	  is	  the	  claim	  that	   this	  need	   is	   a	   genuinely	   epistemic	  one.	  To	  what	   epistemic	   aim,	  does	  one	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	   dismiss	   the	   relevant	   error	   possibilities?	   One	  plausible	   answer	   is	   that	   the	   latter	   constitute	   themselves	   in	   normative	  defeaters	   and,	   as	   such,	   the	   hearer	   (epistemically)	   should	   not	   believe	   the	  speaker’s	  assertion	  unless	  suited	  defeater	  defeaters	  are	  offered.	  This	  reply,	  indeed,	  seems	  to	  be	  innocent	  of	  any	  pragmatic	  normative	  consequences	  for	  belief.	  Note,	  however,	  that	  this	  reply	  will	  not	  do	  its	   job	  in	  supporting	  SA’s	  claim	  against	  KNA,	   i.e.	   the	   claim	   than	  more	   than	  knowledge	   is	   needed	   in	  high	  stakes	  context	  for	  proper	  assertability.	  After	  all,	  plausibly	  enough,	  the	  same	  normative	   defeaters	   that	   forbid	   the	   hearer	   from	  believing	  will	   also	  (normatively)	   act	   on	   the	   speaker’s	   epistemic	   standing.	   As	   such,	   the	  defender	   of	   KNA	   can	   easily	   help	   herself	   to	   the	   same	   explanation	   of	   the	  Shiftiness	   Intuition	  here:	   the	   reason	  why	   the	  speaker	  needs	   to	  be	  able	   to	  dismiss	   relevant	   error	   possibilities	   constituting	   themselves	   in	   normative	  defeaters	  is	  because,	  otherwise,	  he	  fails	  to	  have	  knowledge,	  and	  therefore	  is	  not	  permitted	  to	  assert	  by	  KNA.	  	  	  	  
5.	  Conclusion	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This	  paper	  has	  identified	  a	  strong	  incompatibility	  between	  a	  very	  popular	  view	   concerning	   the	   normativity	   of	   assertion	   –	   what	   I	   have	   dubbed	  assertion	  sensitivism	  –	  and	  a	   fairly	  uncontroversial	  value-­‐theoretic	   thesis	  concerning	  the	  association	  between	  norms	  and	  values	  of	   the	  same	  type.	   I	  have	   argued	   that	   assertion	   sensitivism,	   as	   a	   thesis	   about	   the	   epistemic	  normativity	  of	  assertion,	   is	  untenable	   in	  conjunction	  with	   the	  Association	  Claim.	   To	   show	   this,	   I	   have	   picked	   the	   most	   popular	   candidates	   for	   the	  main	  epistemic	  goods	  in	  the	  literature,	  and	  showed	  how	  SA’s	  claims	  either	  turn	   out	   false,	   or	   collapse	   the	   view	   into	   knowledge	   sensitivism,	   i.e.	   the	  position	  champions	  of	  SA	  were	  trying	  to	  avoid	  to	  begin	  with.17	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